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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1829 
___________ 
 
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC 
 
v. 
 
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 2.59 ACRES,  
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 5.45 ACRES AND  
TEMPORARY ACCESS EASEMENT FOR 2.12 ACRES  
IN PINE GROVE TOWNSHIP, SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, PA,  
TAX PARCEL NUMBER 21-04-0016.000, 361 CHAPEL DRIVE,  
PINE GROVE, PINE GROVE TOWNSHIP, SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, PA;  
RYAN J. REGEC 
 
       Ryan J. Regec, 
                  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-17-cv-00289) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2017 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 12, 2017) 
___________ 
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OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Ryan J. Regec appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellee 
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company’s motion for partial summary judgment and 
request for a preliminary injunction.  For the reasons below, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order as to the preliminary injunction. 
 The procedural and factual history of this case are well known to the parties, set 
forth in the District Court’s opinion, and need not be discussed at length.  Briefly, in 
February 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted Appellee a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity (certificate), authorizing it to construct a 
natural gas pipeline.  In order to build the pipeline, Appellee requires rights of way on a 
piece of property Regec owns.  The certificate was issued after a lengthy administrative 
review process which included notice to property owners affected and an opportunity to 
respond.  Regec did not participate in the administrative proceedings. 
  After Regec and Appellee could not agree on the compensation to be paid for the 
needed property interests, Appellee filed a complaint in condemnation for temporary and 
permanent easements against Regec and his land.  Appellee moved for partial summary 
judgment, seeking condemnation of the rights of way and leaving the issue of just 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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compensation for later litigation.  It also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction for 
immediate possession of the rights of way.  After a hearing at which Regec was 
represented by counsel, the District Court granted both motions, giving Appellee 
possession of the rights of way at issue.  Regec filed a pro se notice of appeal. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), which 
provides for jurisdiction in the District Court for eminent domain actions under the 
Natural Gas Act.  We have jurisdiction over the grant of the preliminary injunction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  The grant of partial summary judgment, however, is 
not before us as the order did not end the litigation as to all claims and all parties.  See 
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963).  Nor was the order certified by the 
District Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), which provides that the District Court 
may direct entry of judgment as to fewer than all claims if it “expressly determines that 
there is no just reason for delay.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).1   
We review the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for an abuse of 
discretion but review the District Court’s underlying legal conclusions de novo.  Brown 
                                              
1 By its citation of Operating Sys. Support, Inc. v. Wang Labs., Inc., 52 F. App’x 160, 
164-65 (3d Cir. 2002), Appellee appears to argue that we should assert pendent appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s grant of partial summary judgment.  “Pendent 
appellate jurisdiction exists where an appealable issue is so inextricably intertwined with 
a nonappealable issue that one cannot resolve the former without addressing the latter.”  
Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2014).  The doctrine of 
pendent appellate jurisdiction is narrow and should be used sparingly.  See id.  We 
decline to assert pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s ruling on the 
merits here.  If he chooses, Regec may appeal the grant of partial summary judgment 
when the District Court issues its final order resolving all claims. 
4 
 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009).  To obtain injunctive relief, a 
party must show a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm if the injunction 
is not granted, that relief will not cause greater harm to the nonmoving party, and that 
relief is in the public interest.  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 Likelihood of success on the merits 
 In order to bring suit in federal court under the Natural Gas Act, the plaintiff must 
have been granted a certificate by the FERC, it must have been unable to acquire the 
rights of way by a contract with the property owner, and the value of the property interest 
as claimed by the owner must be more than $3000.  15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).  Regec does not 
dispute any of these elements.  The Act provides that if the holder of a certificate is 
unable to acquire the needed rights of ways by contract with the landowner, it may 
automatically acquire the rights of way through eminent domain in a United States 
District Court.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 
Acres, 768 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2014).  The only remaining issue to be decided by the 
District Court is the compensation the landowner receives in return for the condemnation.  
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 768 F.3d at 304.  As Appellee fulfilled the 
requirements under § 717f(h) for taking the property interests by eminent domain, it has 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its condemnation claim. 
 While Regec claims that several statutes and rules relied on by the District Court 
violated the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions, the argument underlying these 
claims is that the condemnation of his property interests violated his constitutional right 
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to due process.  However, Regec received notice that Appellee was seeking a certificate 
that included necessary rights of way on his property.  He had the opportunity to 
comment on and intervene in the administrative process before the FERC.  He did not do 
so.  Because he received notice and the opportunity to respond in the FERC proceedings 
and will have the opportunity to litigate just compensation in the District Court, Regec 
has received the process he was due. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (“The Fifth Amendment does 
not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.  Nor 
does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or 
contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a ‘reasonable, certain and 
adequate provision for obtaining compensation’  exist at the time of the taking.”) (internal 
citation omitted); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(fundamental requirements of due process are notice and opportunity to be heard); 
Elterich v. City of Sea Isle City, 477 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1973) (exercise of eminent 
domain power does not violate due process).  Regec’s arguments do not undermine 
Appellee’s likelihood of success on the merits. 
 Regec argues that Appellee’s taking of his property goes beyond the reach of the 
FERC certificate because the permanent right of way for the pipeline will cut off his 
access to part of the property not covered by the certificate.  Regec also claims that the 
taking of the property constitutes an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because he will be unable to access the property.  However, as noted by the 
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District Court, the impact of the taking on the rest of his property is an issue for the 
determination of just compensation.  Moreover, we note that Appellee explained at the 
hearing in the District Court the measures it takes to assure that a landowner has access to 
his property during construction.  Tr. 3/23/17 at 25-26. 
 Because Appellee demonstrated success on the merits of its condemnation claim, 
this factor weighed heavily in favor of the injunction.  See also In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 
F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (when considering motions to stay, the most important 
factor is whether the petitioner has made a strong showing of the likelihood of success on 
the merits). 
 Irreparable Harm 
To support its need for immediate possession of the rights of way, Appellee set 
forth in the District Court the significant monetary and contractual harms it would suffer 
if the extensive, complicated construction of the pipeline were to be delayed.2  Regec 
complains that he was not given discovery to determine the veracity of testimony given 
by Appellee’s witnesses at the hearing.  However, he does not point to any statements 
that he believes were inaccurate.  He also contends that the injunction is premature as 
Appellee needs to complete several field surveys and conditions before construction 
begins.  But Appellee requires the right to access the property at issue in order to 
                                              
2 Appellee asserted that unless it was given immediate possession, it would lose $500,000 
per month, and revenues of $33 million per month would be delayed.  Delay in 
possession would also cause Appellee to breach contracts with subcontractors and 
vendors.  Appellee’s brief at 29.  
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complete those field surveys.  While generally a harm that can be remedied by monetary 
relief is not considered irreparable, a financial loss may be irreparable if the expenditures 
cannot be recouped.  See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2010) (Scalia, 
J.) (in chambers).  We believe such is the case here.  The monetary harm the Appellee 
would have suffered if immediate possession had not been allowed weighed in favor of 
the injunction. 
 Harm to nonmoving party 
 Regec argues several sources of harm to him from the injunction:  (1) he will be 
subject to liability if a pipeline worker is hurt on his property; (2) there will be a loss of 
timber during the construction; and (3) he will lose the ability to develop his property.  
However, as noted above, the impact of the condemnation on his property’s value can be 
addressed during the just compensation determination.  Further, Regec does not explain 
why he would be held legally liable for an injury during construction by Appellee.  And 
while he claims that the District Court’s decision has “stigmatized” him, he does not 
describe how it has hurt his reputation.  And even if we were to consider the harm to 
Regec as weighing against the injunction, it would not counterbalance the likelihood of 
success and irreparable harm factors which weigh strongly in favor of the injunction. 
 Public Interest 
 As noted by the District Court, the public interest factor weighed in favor of 
granting the injunction because the pipeline will give the public access to the natural gas 
carried by the pipeline.  Regec argues that a “public need” satisfying the “public use” has 
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not been pleaded to support the injunction.  However, in its brief in support of its motion 
for the injunction, Appellee clearly set forth the public need for the pipeline. 
 Conclusion 
 The District Court did not err legally or abuse its discretion in its weighing of the 
relevant factors or in issuing the preliminary injunction.  For the reasons above and those 
set forth by the District Court, we will affirm the District Court’s order concerning the 
preliminary injunction. 
